

Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant as an example of effective development of the Soviet economy of industry in the postwar period

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Introduction. *In conditions when the leadership of modern Russia is trying to carry out social and economic reforms, is trying to modernize its industry, financial system, successful experience of industrial reform in difficult socio-economic conditions should and must be in demand. An example of a successful solution to all problems facing the country can be an experience of not only rapid and effective restoration of the national economy which was destroyed during the Second World War, but also the example of the creation of new sectors of the national economy, in particular the automotive industry, in the post-war period (1946-1955).*

The heritage of economic history should be a successful experience of construction of the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant and related production facilities (combined heat and plant for the production of compact engines). For modern historical science, not only in Russia, but also in other countries, it is interesting: in conditions of post-war devastation, an acute shortage of engineering and technical personnel, a shortage of building materials and limited financial resources in the late 1940s and early 1950s dates to launch modern automotive production - Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant and related enterprises.

Object. *In the presented material with the example of the construction of the largest automobile plant in the industry reveals experience of organizational work to create a completely new production. Examples of resolving management issues and problems, operational leadership methods are given, and the process of making non-standard socio-economic decisions to mobilize limited human, material and financial resources is analyzed to ultimately not only complete complex organizational and technical tasks in the shortest possible time, but put the enterprises into operation, but also to provide in a timely manner the release of trucks and other products, which the country needed so much after the war.*

Purpose of study. *The purpose of the study and subsequent analysis was to clarify the factors and*

conditions that contributed to and hindered the construction of the automobile plant in a particular region. The experience of organizational and political work on mobilizing the workforce for labor achievements and feats in the most difficult socio-economic situation of the majority of workers, examples of solving personnel problems, and working with suppliers in the integration chain was subjected to serious study and analysis. As well as ways to solve complex technical problems.

Materials and methods of study. *The study is based primarily on archival materials, previously unknown to modern science, scientific literature and publications covering this problem, all sorts of statistical sources. The authors widely relied on the materials of the reports of the directorate's enterprises, party committees of plants, eyewitness's accounts. The materials of the periodical press were widely used. In the course of studying these and other materials, the information reflected in them was systematized and analyzed. A systematic approach, comparative and statistical analysis, as well as a logical generalization of the data and comparative analysis were widely used.*

Study result. *In the course of the study, factors were identified and systematized, both contributing to and hindering the construction of the automobile plant, the goals and objectives set for the enterprise team and other related industries were disclosed, and examples of solving complex organizational and technical problems were given. In addition, new facts related to the history of the industry of a country and a specific region were identified and presented, the production indicators of the plant were analyzed in full during the period of construction and its launch into design figures.*

Discussion and conclusion. *The results indicate that the experience gained in the construction of the largest enterprise in the most difficult socio-economic conditions of the post-war devastation should and must be claimed in modern conditions.*

Keywords. *Automobile plant, engineering personnel, management, construction, disruption, social conditions, financing, rationalization and inventive work, implementation, cooperation, transport supplies, spare parts, socialist competition, labor heroism.*

Introduction.

Established in 1943, the Ulyanovsk Region made its huge industrial contribution to the country's victory in the Great Patriotic War. The evacuation of many enterprises from the western part of the country to the area of combat operations facilitated it. The simultaneous arrival in small Ulyanovsk of a significant number of evacuated plants and factories, highly qualified engineering and labor personnel was the main prerequisite for turning the city into one of the largest industrial center,

which made a huge contribution of providing the army and navy with necessary goods.

Another major prerequisite for the construction in the Ulyanovsk region of large-scale automotive production was the arrival in the region of a large part of the equipment and personnel of a truck plant evacuated from Moscow. It was the creation of an automotive assembly production in the city in 1941 that was the beginning of the construction of a completely new automobile plant in the post-war period. Initially, the automobile plant worked as an assembly enterprise for the assembly of trucks for the front.

In 1944, by the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the construction of a full-cycle automobile plant began with the task of starting to collect GAZ-AA cars with an annual production of at least 75,000 cars a year. In July 1945, workers of the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant initiated the competition between the country's automobile plants in honor of the victory over fascism. They were supported by the employees of the Moscow Automobile Plant, the Gorky Automobile Plant, and other automobile manufacturing enterprises in the country.¹

These and other factors, among which the most important were the availability of transport and energy infrastructure, as well as trained personnel for future production, had a decisive influence on the decision taken by the Soviet leadership. On 26 of August, 1945, the State Defense Committee adopted a special resolution “On the restoration and development of the automotive industry”, where the specific task was to restore the level of pre-war production and switch to the production of new trucks and cars.²

The leadership of the automobile plant set to work vigorously, but for a number of reasons, the main of which was the lack of sufficient raw materials, it was not possible to bring the number of cars to the required number, but by 1947, in cooperation with the Gorky automobile plant, the production of trucks reached 39 thousand trucks a year³

A serious factor that, due to other, no less valid reasons, slowed down the construction of the automobile plant within the timeframe set by the plan, was the redevelopment of the newly created and not having time to gather production capacity for the production of non-core products, was the reorientation of the majority of plant workshops to the production of completely new products, the plant equipment was not calculated – radar station "DMS-4". It was necessary, from 1944, literally on the move to adapt the plant workshops, designed for the production of cars, re-equip for the production of radar stations with a completely different technological process.

¹ Istoriya Ulyanovskogo avtomobilnogo zavoda. Samara .: Samarskoye kn. izd-vo, 1988 P. 34

² Ibid. P. 39

³ Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii Ulyanovskoi oblasti (daleye GANI UO), Fond 8, OP. 1, D. 139

According to A.N. Vikentiev, underfinancing of automotive industry enterprises, including the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant, became a serious reason for not achieving the planned indicators for the production of cars. In 1944, according to the government decree, by 1947 it was planned to allocate 850 million rubles, but in reality, by 1950, 400 million rubles had been allocated, which was less than 50% of the required money.⁴ In less than 6 years, starting in 1944, a CHP plant with a capacity of 24 thousand kW and a production area of 92 thousand square meters was commissioned at the plant. An important role in the construction of the plant was played by construction and installation teams, staffed by prisoners. Total archival data allows to judge the work of 1500 people from among those serving sentences. Their work continued from 1946 to 1952.⁵

The main construction started in 1946-1947. Tasks were voluminous. At the place of the dilapidated temporary workshops of the barrack type, which were built in a hurry during the Great Patriotic War, new, modern workshops were built for the future automobile plant and compact engine production plant. In the shortest possible time, a combined heat and power plant (a power plant capable of producing hot water for heating workshops), a mechanical assembly building, a workshop for the main conveyor, forge, foundry and other workshops were built.

The events of those distant years for the present, for a number of reasons, did not become the subject of serious scientific study, although a number of authors cited examples of successfully solving production problems at the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant, for example, V.S. Andreev pointing out that by the mid-1950s the position of the employees of this enterprise was one of the best in Russia.⁶ A brief essay on the history of labor reserves and their role in the replenishment of workers in the automotive industry enterprises was written by A.D. Volkov.⁷

B.S. Gerashchenko and S.R. Gershberg included the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant to one of the best enterprises in the country in the field of shock workers using the possibilities of socialist competition and labor production's.⁸ Extremely sparingly speaking about the construction of The Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant, the authors of the multivolume work "The History of the Socialist Economy of the USSR".⁹

Much more information is contained in the multi-volume edition "Soldiers of the Labor Front"

⁴ Vikentiev A. N. Ocherki razvitiya sovetskoi ekonomiki v chetyvortoi pyatiletke. M., 1952 P. 118

⁵ GANI UO, F. 8, OP. 1, D. 141, L. 103

⁶ Andreev V. S. Sotsialnoye obespecheniye v SSSR. - M. : Yurizdat, 1971 p. 111-112

⁷ Volkov A.D. Rasshirennoye vosproizvodstvo kvalifitsirovannoi rabochei sily v SSSR. M., 1961 p. 200

⁸ Gerashchenko B.S. Novyi moshchnyi podiyom narodnogo khozyaistva v pervoi poslevoyennoi pyatiletke. M., 1951 P. 33; Gershberg S. R. Dvizhenie kollektivov i udarnikov kommunisticheskogo truda. M., 1961 P. 99

⁹ Istoriya sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki SSSR. M, 1972. t. 5 P. 230-231

published in Ulyanovsk¹⁰ and in the book "History of the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant"¹¹. However, both of these books were written in the form of brief essays on the heroism of individual plant employees, both during the war and in the post-war period, and by definition, on the solution of construction and production tasks at the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant, cannot be given. At the same time, we must pay tribute to the authors of these collective works for these works, revealing the dedication and labor heroism of the employees of the Automobile Plant, manifested in difficult conditions.

Methods. The practical basis for the article was the materials of the State Archive of the Newest History of the Ulyanovsk Region, as well as the newspaper collections of the Ulyanovsk Palace of Books. In the course of the study, this information was systematized and analyzed. A systematic approach, a comparative analysis and a logical generalization of the results were used.

Results. Our analysis makes it possible to judge that in the first post-war years the construction of the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant faced enormous difficulties. In the 1946/1947 reporting year, the planned targets were not met due to the lack of a proper number of qualified construction personnel, underfunding, late delivery of bricks, cement, reinforced concrete structures.¹² During this period, the plant faced the most significant difficulties, starting in 1945. The greatest difficulties were associated with the lack of building materials - brick, lime, alabaster, plastering.¹³

However, in 1947/1948 the situation has changed dramatically, as evidenced by the data presented¹⁴:

Table 1
Implementation of the production program of the I.V. Stalin Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant 1947/1948:

Production figures for 1946/1947 in comparison with indicators of 1947/1948 in thousands of rubles				In% to planned and real indicators	
	Report 1946/1947	1947 plan	Report 1947/1948	To plan	To the report of 1947/1948 in%
Car release	1	1	730	-	-
Release of auto spares	-	1000	516	51,6	
The introduction of	1267	3760	4523	120,3	357,7

¹⁰ Soldaty trudovogo fronta v 5 t. Ulyanovsk., 1999 – 2008

¹¹ Istoriya Ulyanovskogo avtomobilnogo zavoda. Samara .: Samarskoye kn. izd-vo, 1988

¹² GANI UO, F. 13, OP. 1, D. 2371, L. 2 – 5

¹³ Ibid. D. 2372, L. 72

¹⁴ GANI UO, F. 13, OP. 1, D. 2371, L. 3

new tools and equipment					
The introduction of new equipment	1598	2525	1947	77,2	121,7
Repair of equipment	560	815	1901	233,0	339,5
Services and other works	4238	405	3331	822,0	77,7
Consumer goods and other works	67	35	6	17,1	8,9
Total: commercial products	7730	8540	12954	151,7	167,5
Gain tooling	873	-	207	-	-

Leadership of the Ulyanovsk region and I.V. Stalin Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant understood that it is necessary, first of all, to be engaged in the construction complex, since the disruption by the builders of planning tasks seriously hampered the commissioning of the entire production complex.

The key to successful work of the team of the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant was the critical assessment of bottlenecks, shortcomings and timely decisions aimed at improving the situation. The task of the Ministry of Automobile Transport on the development of the automobile plant team together with the construction trust No. 18 using 66 900 thousand rubles was not fulfilled. Although the team fulfilled enormous tasks: the commissioning of the first stage of CHP-1 was completed, the main conveyor workshop, the mechanical assembly workshop, the chassis and gearbox production workshops were practically completed, the installation of the tool housing was completed, the new housing for workers was completed, no less in 1946 it was not possible to reach the output of 100 cars per day. The construction trust number 18 fulfilled the planned figures by 37.1% and the plant for the construction of housing and social and cultural facilities with a means of income only by 51.5%.

First of all the suppliers have seriously failed the Gorky Automobile Plant¹⁵. To fulfill the plans, workers of the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant start, on their own initiative to develop a number of the most important parts and assemblies according to the temporary version, since this was facilitated by the arrival of equipment obtained as a result of reparations from Germany. Literally in two years, in

¹⁵ GANI UO, F. 8, OP. 8, D. 436, L. 12 – 18

the period from 1946 to 1948, production of more than 200 of the most crucial parts was arranged, and more than 6000 units of tooling and accessories were designed¹⁶.

Particularly difficult tasks faced the blacksmith shop, headed by K.I. Buslaev. Within six months after the launch of the first stage of the blacksmith's shop, under his leadership, several of the most important forgings were possible for the plant, among which the crosspiece and the gear shift fork were the most important¹⁷.

The leadership of the region, the city took the most significant measures in order to improve the situation. In connection with the acute shortage of personnel, the camp of prisoners No. 215 was transferred to the plant, the number of workers increased to 1,000. In addition, from the nearest correctional labor colony No. 3, more than 800 people were allocated daily for work. According to the targeted government decree, 2 million rubles were allocated for working capital to strengthen trust № 18¹⁸. In the third quarter of 1947, the leadership of the region, which understood the importance of the government assignment, assigned 3,000 cubic meters of timber, 400 tons of alabaster, 600 tons of cement to attract skilled workers to build housing economically¹⁹.

Despite all the difficulties, the plant was started on time. On 25 of October, 1947, the assembly of the first trucks began on the main assembly line. By the end of 1947, 146 cars were assembled. In 1947/1948, in comparison with the previous period, by products we observe the following picture²⁰: (See Table 2)

Table 2

№ in/o	Production figures	Unit of measurement	Report for 1946/1947	1946/1947		1947/1948	
				Plan	Fact	To plan	To the report for 1946/1947
1	Production output (total)	thousand roubles	14158	17053	18452	102,8	130,4
2	Including engines L-3/2	thousand roubles	9314	13000	13027	100,2	139,9
3	Spares for engines	thousand roubles	1231	1600	1812	113,2	147,2
4	Engine L-6/3	thousand roubles		3240	216	6,6	-
5	Consumer	thousand	246	113	127	112,4	51,6

¹⁶ Istoriya Ulyanovskogo avtomobilnogo zavoda. Samara .: Samarskoye kn. izd-vo, 1988 P. 90

¹⁷ Ibid. P. 95

¹⁸ GANI UO, F. 8, OP. 5, D. 277, L. 76

¹⁹ Ibid. L. 77

²⁰ GANI UO, F. 13, OP. 1, D. 2372, L. 54

	Goods	roubles					
6	Other products	thousand roubles	3154	-	3270	-	103,7

The enterprise began to be built immediately as a full-cycle production. During 6 years, the following workshops were put into operation: forge, tool shop, chassis, gearboxes, motors, thermal, woodworking, as well as the main workshop where the assembly conveyor was located. The growth of production was largely due to the fact that by 1954 the press-forging shop with an area of 35 thousand square meters was built at the plant²¹. For 6 years the plant's collective has grown from 6000 people to 9000 in 1954.

Construction success in the construction of the plant was accompanied by successful work in strengthening the country's defense, when in 1954 alone the plant produced 300 DMS-4 radar stations²².

At the same time, not everything was as successful as the leaders of the country and the region, the plant's directors would like. We give the figures of the I.V. Stalin Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant in the first 9 months of 1950²³ (See: Table 3):

Table 3

Production figures of the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant for the first 9 months of 1950:

№ in/o	Production figures	Unit of measurement	Target figures	Implementation targets (from report)	Percentage of completion %
1	Gross production	thousand roubles.	381970	387350	101,4
2	Commercial products:				
3	Assembled cars -	pieces	28 400	27 773	97,8
4	Rented cars -	pieces	28 400	27 989	98,6
5	Produced auto spares	thousand roubles.	17 550	17 980	102,5
6	Consumer goods produced	thousand roubles.	144	161	111,8
7	IPC (Inter-plant cooperation)	thousand roubles.	332	454	136,7
8	Installed new equipment	thousand roubles.	865	1569	181,4

²¹ Pecherkin K. Nasushchnye zadachi razvitiya ekonomiki Ulyanovskoi oblasti // Ulyanovskaya Pravda. 1953. 12 February.

²² Gerasin F. Po puti, ukazannom partiyei. Razvitiye ekonomiki Ulyanovskoi oblasti za 40 let // Ulyanovskaya Pravda. 1957. 7 June

²³ GANI UO, F. 8, OP. 8, D. 436, L. 12

9	Repaired equipment	thousand roubles.	450	1129	250,9
10	Other products	thousand roubles.	10 000	12 235	No plan
11	Number of employees in the main production	people	4 683	4 868	105,6
12	Development for one working list	roubles.	81 565	79 570	97,6
13	Expenditure payroll in absolute terms	thousand roubles.	47 934	48 422	101,0
14	Expenditure payroll in absolute terms	thousand roubles.	48 605	48 422	99,6
15	Cost of commercial products	thousand roubles.	379 106	368 706	Savings of 10 400 thousand rubles
16	Cost per car	roubles.	12 350	12 172	98,6
17	Mastering new components and parts	pieces	107	102	95,3
	Labor turnover:				
18	Recruited:			1 256	
	Dismissed from work for various reasons:			969	
19	Number of workers assigned to the Stakhanovists	people	-	1 759	
20	The number of shock workers of socialist labor	people	-	1 358	
21	Loss from reject	thousand roubles.	2 217	1 035	46,7

It can be seen from the table above that the plant did not fulfill the production plan (98.6%) for the vehicles that were handed over to the state acceptance of the vehicles, and the production plan for one payroll worker was also not fulfilled. Severe social conditions contributed to significant staff turnover, which exceeded 1000 people and exceeded 10% of the total membership.

The losses from the reject were large enough to exceed 2 million rubles in 1948 prices²⁴.

The state of affairs was corrected by 1950, when 39,000 GAZ-MM trucks and spares for them to the amount of 23,979 rubles were produced, largely contributed to the fact that for the first time in the post-war period the city and region leaderships began to solve the enterprise's social and cultural

²⁴ Sodchenko V., Shinyavsky A. Za vysokoproizvoditelnoye ispolzovaniye promyshlennogo oborudovaniya // Ulyanovskaya Pravda. 1955. 12 November

problems. First, in view of the complete destruction of the club - a frame-filling barrack built in 1941, a new club with a capacity of 650 people was built at the plant, which allowed workers to hold film shows, amateur concerts, and organize other cultural and political-educational work. In 1951-1952, the trolleybus line connecting the center of the city with the plant was put into operation, which significantly improved the transport supply²⁵.

As a result of the measures taken, the plant not only fulfilled, but also exceeded the planned figures for 1950-1951, as evidenced by the following data (see Table 4):

Table 4

Production figures of the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant in 1950-1951²⁶:

№ in/o	Production figures	Plan	Report	In% to the executed plan
1	By gross production in thousand rubles	519447	534085	102,8
2	For marketable products in thousand rubles.	509803	530119	104,0
3	Handed over cars	23400	24048	102,8
4	Auto spares, in thousand rubles	441	565	128,1
5	Inter-plant cooperation, in thousand rubles	193	213	110,6
6	Consumer goods, in thousand rubles	1247	3137	251,6
7	New equipment	100%		101,8

What were the reasons for such high rates of production, quite recently put into operation? Firstly, labor enthusiasm, since all the workers of the plant, from the foreman to the cleaning staff, understood that the enterprise was exclusive, its products were extremely important for the country, especially in view of the difficult international situation and the need to strengthen its army and navy. Secondly, an effective competition was organized at the plant. When for the positive results of the work as a whole in the Ministry of Automotive and Tractor Industry of the USSR in 1952, for the third quarter, the third place was awarded, and for the fourth quarter - 2nd place, many at the plant received awards. Premiums were established due to a significant reduction in the cost of production; everyone

²⁵ GANI UO, F. 8, OP. 9, D. 403, L. 12 – 14

²⁶ GANI UO, F. 8, OP. 8, D. 228, L. 57, 62

knew this and strove for it. Starting in 1949, a competition between teams of fitters began at the automobile plant. The main measure of its effectiveness was the high quality of its products²⁷.

At the plant in 1948-1949 43 Komsomol youth brigades were created, according to the results of 1949, the best of them were teams headed by A. Karacheva, E. Tarasova and V. Egorova. During the study, this information was systematized and analyzed. A systematic approach, a comparative analysis and a logical generalization of the results were used²⁸.

Thirdly, the successful solution of social issues at the plant, in comparison with other enterprises of the city, attracted production personnel to the automobile plant. Only in 1950, the plant team increased by 1,511 people, including engineers and technicians - by 175 people. Everyone knew that the enterprise is constantly developing, it has great prospects and this was one of the main incentives for the employees of the enterprise to highly productive work²⁹. The successful personnel policy was largely helped by the rhythmic work of the labor reserve system, which constantly sent specialists in working specialties, as well as the fact that by 1951 the enterprise had already ceased to need the use of prisoners and prisoners of war³⁰.

Fourthly, the plant team and leadership were able to fully take advantage of the capabilities of the new equipment installed at the plant, to properly organize its operation and maintenance, which created, in the end huge competitive advantages in comparison with other enterprises. This allowed to significantly increase labor productivity and reduce labor intensity³¹.

Fifthly, after the appointment of the director of the automobile plant I.K. Loskutov, the course was taken to form the engineering department of the plant at the automobile plant. First of all, he relied on the automotive technical collage created in July 1944, a real “forge of personnel” of the engineering and technical staff of the plant. Director of the Technical Collage A.M. Golubev, not having premises suitable for study, organized the training of future technicians directly at the car assembly production - forging, stamping, foundry, and cold processing³².

The team has proven itself so positively that it has repeatedly been assigned extraordinary government tasks. Thus, in 1951, due to a sharp deterioration in the international situation due to the beginning of the Cold War and confrontation with Western countries, the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant was ordered to organize the production of radar stations unusual for the plant. This task was very

²⁷ Istoriya Ulyanovskogo avtomobilnogo zavoda. Samara .: Samarskoye kn. izd-vo, 1988 P. 101 – 102

²⁸ Zhigulin K. Perspektivy nashego dela // Ulyanovskaya Pravda. 1949. 18 January

²⁹ GANI UO, F. 8, OP. 8, D. 228, L. 63

³⁰ Ibid. L. 78 – 81

³¹ Istoriya Ulyanovskogo avtomobilnogo zavoda. Samara .: Samarskoye kn. izd-vo, 1988 P. 90

³² Ibid. P. 78

difficult, as previously such stations in the automobile plant were not produced. Due to a number of circumstances, the plant was unable to switch to the release of this completely unfamiliar new product in a timely manner and certain difficulties arose.

In 1952, the plant was visited by a government commission, which made serious conclusions on disrupting the production target dates for placing LADOGA products, that is, radar stations, on the conveyor. The commission concluded that the disruption of production indicators was due to the late delivery of the required 8 sets of high-quality technical documentation to the automobile plant, and the failure to comply with the production plans for delivery on time. Construction Trust No. 39 also made a significant contribution to the failure to meet the deadlines for the fulfillment of the government task, who did not prepare the constructed workshops for the installation of new equipment in a timely manner. However, the main reason was the failure by the ministries of the Aviation Industry, the Ministry of Armament and Shipbuilding to fulfill the government task of transferring and posting radio engineers, radio operators and radar documentation to the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant. Among other reasons, unsatisfactory material and technical supply, as well as late delivery of components and delivery of defective spares were mentioned. Financial provision also played its unsatisfactory role³³. However, despite all the difficulties, the government task for the production of cars, as well as other (military products) was successfully completed, as evidenced by the dynamics of industrial production of the I.V. Stalin Automobile Plant in the period from 1951 to 1955 (See table 5).

Table 5

The dynamics of growth in the output of commodity products of the I.V. Stalin Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant in the period from 1951 to 1955 (in prices of 1952)³⁴.

№ in/o	Years	Actual output of commodity products in 1952 prices in thousands of rubles	Dynamics in%
1	1951	201032	100,0
2	1952	155218	77,3
3	1953	371018	184,5
4	1954	491392	244,4
5	1955	Expected release 603854	300,4
Expected quarterly release in 1955:			

³³ GANI UO, F. 8, OP. 8, D. 455, L. 48 – 49

³⁴ Ibid. D. 456, L. 67 – 68

6	I quarter	124258	100
7	II quarter	150842	121,3
8	III quarter	170183	136,9

From the above figures it can be seen that during the entire period the automobile plant fulfilled the planned indicators, except for 1952, when the automobile plant was instructed to set up production of products unusual for the plant - radar stations as soon as possible, although the automobile plant coped brilliantly with this complex task.

It should be emphasized that the timely commissioning of the capacity of the automobile plant was largely determined by the stable operation of the related enterprises. The main of the enterprises – subcontractors was a motor plant (a plant for the production of compact engines). In 1946, it began not only its work, but also successfully fulfilled all the plans set for its team. If in 1946 the plant produced 9314 engines, then in next 1947, production increased to 13027 units³⁵. In addition to the production of cars, the plant produced spares for agricultural machinery and tractors, as evidenced below data (See Table 6).

Table 6

Results of the compact engine plant for the production of spares for agricultural machinery and tractors in 1946/1947³⁶:

Implementation of production indicators by quarter					
Reporting period	Implementation (thousand roubles.)	Plan	Fact	% Plan	Implementation targets
I quarter	77,7	50,4	57,2	113,4	78,5
II quarter	34,4	61,2	56,6	92,5	164,6
III quarter	41,5	47,5	46,0	96,8	111,0
IV quarter	54,3	38,6	66,8	173,0	123,1
Total for the year	208,1	197,7	226,6	114,6	108,9

The compact engine plant successfully fulfilled the plan, first of all, through the use of multi-station service, which was organized by advanced workers and shock workers of production, with the active support of engineering and technical personnel, as well as through mass movement to combine professions³⁷.

The successful implementation of production plans was largely facilitated by the

³⁵ Ibid. L. 75 – 77

³⁶ Ibid. L. 139.

³⁷ B / a Na vakhte trudovoi. Ulyanovskomy motornomu zavodu – 40 let // Ulyanovskaya Pravda, 1984. 7 September

establishment of successful cooperation with the Gorky Automobile Plant and the Moscow Searchlight Plant. Cooperation was particularly unsatisfactory in the years 1955-1956, and also in 1955, when the GAZ-69 all-terrain vehicle was put on the conveyor. So, for example, in 1955, out of the 145 names of components and parts that GAZ was supposed to supply, 133 names were not fully provided, and for 12 names the plant did not fulfill its obligations at all, which caused non-rhythmic operation of the main conveyor. Understanding the difficult situation of Gorky's colleagues, who were also let down by suppliers, took over some of the most demanded products, placed orders for components in advance, and in order for the facilities not to stand idle, produce other products until GAZ provided the required level of cooperation³⁸.

And in this case, as in 1948-1949, The leadership had to think again how to adequately get out of the current situation and successfully overcome the difficulties that had arisen. Thus, in 1951, a non-ferrous casting section was created in the machine-assembly building by the efforts of the leadership and engineers of the plant, which produced the first complex product in 1954. The team of the CHP, headed by A.V. Goryachev worked selflessly for the needs of the plant. This production site in a timely manner provided the plant with heat, electric energy, steam and compressed air.³⁹

Discussion.

Assessing all the events related to the construction of the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant, it can be said that when construction a new automobile plant, the team faced enormous difficulties, the failure to solve which could lead to the disruption of the task.

It has been established that the construction leadership clearly caught those bottlenecks that had to be addressed with the main efforts. The key to success was laid in improving the work of construction and installation trusts, providing construction, who experienced interruptions in the supply of materials, as well as a shortage of manpower. These problems were solved through the supply of local building materials, as well as the massive involvement of labor of prisoners and prisoners of war, the additional allocation of mechanization funds and vehicles.

An equally important problem that had to be promptly resolved was not the establishment of cooperative relations with plants and suppliers. This problem was solved only by the forces of the automobile plant by establishing independently the release of 200 most important parts.

It was possible to establish that the success of the automobile plant was largely determined by the fact that initially production was planned as a full-cycle enterprise. This was confirmed, firstly,

³⁸ GANI UO, F. 8, OP. 8, D. 457, L. 148 – 149

³⁹ Sulfina E. Skaz pro UAZ // Narodnaya Gazeta. 2001. 12 October

by the need to establish minimum cooperation with allied enterprises, and, secondly, by the ability of the automobile plant in the event of a need to quickly switch to producing atypical products for enterprises of this kind - radar stations.

In many respects, it seems obvious that the successful implementation of state plans was determined by the positive attitude of the workforce to fulfill the tasks set. Necessary positive collective sentiment was formed due to the fact that people saw the prospects for the development of their enterprise, were not afraid of crises and associated staff reductions, felt the care of the plant's leadership about their socio-economic situation. Equally important was the thoughtful organization of competition between individual workers, teams, workshops and enterprises in the industry as a whole. The well thought-out bonus system for high labor indices helped significantly.

The success of the enterprise was the result of a well-thought-out personnel policy that resulted in the enterprise reducing staff turnover to a minimum, ensuring their continuity as a result of mentoring and the smooth operation of the labor reserve system. The case management and the efficient organization of the production process, the skillful use of available resources, and the capabilities of imported (repairs) equipment helped greatly. All this, ultimately, has allowed to significantly increase labor productivity, reduce labor intensity and maximize the competitive advantage.

The success of the enterprise manifested itself fully when fulfilling the responsible state task for the production of radar stations that are not typical for this production, although the enterprise's leadership had to overcome incredible difficulties consisting in the unpreparedness of workshops for new production, untimely supply of components, lack of trained specialists, and disruption of funding.

The successful development of automotive production was greatly facilitated by the rhythmic work of other enterprises belonging to the production complex, in particular enterprises producing compact engines and automobile spares. This was due to the fact that the adjacent production, working in the system of a single complex, also as at the automobile plant, skillfully used multi-machine maintenance, relied on the enthusiasm of the workers, and also used the possibilities of competition and material incentives of the best workers. Gradually, cooperation was established with other related enterprises located outside the Ulyanovsk Region.

Conclusion.

The relevance of the study is that from today's height it makes it possible to appreciate the greatness of the labor achievement of the enterprise's directorate, engineering and technical

personnel, plant workers who, under much more difficult conditions than today, were able to build and put into operation a highly technological one, modern enterprise corresponding to the technical level of the postwar period. The timely introduction of the enterprise into operation became possible also due to the comprehensive support that the enterprise was provided by the leadership of the country, region and city. The higher leaderships not only delved into the needs of the nascent production, but also provided the plant with all the necessary assistance.

Among the conditions, thanks to the fulfillment of which the timely commissioning of the enterprise became possible, was the establishment of cooperation with other related enterprises, the release of those components at the plant, the delivery of which was difficult, as well as the provision of prison labor and prisoners of war under construction.

Success in the construction of the plant in a timely manner was also largely due to the highest motivation of the team for high-productive work, proper organization of competition between departments, as well as the decision, if possible, social conditions of the enterprise's employees.

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